In the 18th century, Sweden launched three wars of aggression: against Russia in 1741, Prussia in 1757 and Russia again in 1788. The rationality of these attacks has been severely questioned in historiography. The Empire's military and economic strength was never sufficient to go to war, and therefore all ended in costly failure. The reason why the wars still happened is usually explained by the hubris or incompetence of the decision-makers themselves, who were allegedly blinded by dreams of grandeur and thus mistook hope for reality. In this thesis, I challenge this view by adopting a cultural-historical perspective on an otherwise classic topic of public policy. Above all, I have analyzed how contemporary notions of honor and glory influenced the thinking and practice of these events. In all cases - I argue - the protection of Sweden's honor was the central driving force for going to war. The wars were therefore not a consequence of inept kings or statesmen, but on the contrary were appropriate in their cultural and historical context. The results of the research mean that many accepted perceptions of early modern politics will be nuanced. The thesis thus contributes to a deeper understanding of the political processes and decisions in the past that may appear difficult to understand or irrational to a modern observer. In addition, it sheds new light on some of the most forgotten events in Swedish history.