Between the years 1631 and 1795, the Swedish state received recurrent subsidies from several European states - mainly France. The subsidies could periodically correspond to 25% of the Swedish state budget and therefore constituted important contributions to Sweden's ability to maintain its independence. Ironically, this independence from enemy nations required that the Swedish state put itself in a position of dependence on alliance partners. Typically, subsidies were paid so that Sweden could a) afford to maintain an army in peacetime, b) afford to intervene in war on the side of the subsidizer, or c) refrain from intervening in a war event. Put simply, the subsidies were used by the donor to gain control of another state's armed forces. Since control over a country's monopoly of violence was central to the exercise of power, subsidies also affected the balance of power in the recipient country. Subsidies were at times necessary for the royal power to be able to afford to maintain a force apparatus as a guarantor of its position in relation to competing power groups within the country - mainly strong noble groups. This in turn made the royal power dependent on external forces to maintain its internal independence. In this study, the importance of the subsidy system for the development of the Swedish state will be studied, who gained from it and who lost. The focus is on the relationship between Sweden and France during the period 1631-1795.