It is characteristic of Swedish law that there is limited scope for the courts to restrict the scope of a statutory rule. One of the reasons for this is that statutory texts are often of a general nature and that it may be difficult for the legislature to predict in advance which application situations may arise and how they should be regulated. By assuming that there are so-called unspoken exceptions, the courts are thus empowered to make the necessary adjustments. For example, the Supreme Court has in several cases deviated from the letter of the law based on considerations of the purpose of the provision. However, a more precise theory of when courts are entitled to deviate from the wording of the law has not emerged. In my work, I intend to review a number of statutory rules in the field of contract law and examine the extent to which the courts have tended to restrict the scope of the rules in question and whether any patterns can be discerned. Furthermore, opinions expressed in Swedish doctrine are inventoried and analyzed. Attention is also paid to well-known international theories in this area. An important part of the work is the development of a theory of a rule formulation's lack of finesse. This theory can be used both as an analytical tool for examining existing law and for proposing changes to it as regards the possibility for the courts to deviate from the scope of a statutory rule.