A significant part of global investment flows is covered by intergovernmental agreements on investment protection. These agreements have been criticized on a number of counts. In particular, the climate impact of the agreements has been questioned recently. It is argued that investment protection agreements slow down the transition towards a climate-sustainable economy by locking economies into existing production systems, in particular by making the phase-out of stranded assets more costly. Economic research on the agreements is still very limited. The overall aim of this project is therefore to initiate research on the design and effects of the agreements from a climate perspective. The project consists of two parts, both at the intersection of economics and law. One much criticized aspect of the agreements is that they allow private investors to bring disputes against host countries (ISDS). A subproject will identify the pros and cons for the parties to the agreements to allow such standing in disputes regarding climate-related measures by host countries. The concept of investors' 'legitimate expectations' plays a central role in investment treaty dispute arbitration, and can be expected to do so also in future climate-related disputes. However, there are divergent legal views on what is meant by the term. The second sub-project will analyze the role of expectations in climate action disputes from an economic perspective.